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IX. Environmental Law 
Introduction 
Nicholas A. Robinson* 
Despite the vast mountain ranges, rivers, parks, coasts and 
forests within the bounds of its jurisdiction, the Second Circuit 
has had little occasion to decide many cases in the area of envi- 
ronmental law.' Nonetheless, sufficient decisions do exist to indi- 
cate tentative outlines of the Second Circuit's disposition tov:ai-d 
such cases. On balance, the Second Circuit. has carefully and 
conservatively hewed to the mandate of Congress in its construc- 
tion of statutes, has mediated t.he competing demands of develop- 
ment and environmental pr~tect~ion, and has cautiously sup- 
ported conservationists while sharply criticizing some of their tae- 
tics in administrative proceedings. This characterization can be 
traced from the early cases of nearly a decade ago through the 
several decisions which construed t.he Nat.iona1 Environmental 
Policy Act of 196g2 [hereinafter referred to as NEPA], including 
the two cases treated in this issue of the Second Circuit Review. 
The national reputation of the Second Circuit among conser- 
vation lawyers was established in Scenic Hudson Preserv~tion 
Conference v. $'PC3 In that case, the court, with Judge Hays 
writing for a unanimous panel, held that Federal Power Commis- 
sion licensing of an electrical generating plant on Storm King 
Mountain violated requirements of t,he Federal Power Act,' by 
failing to consider the fact that 
[tlhe Storm King project is to be located in an area of unique 
beauty and major historical significance. The highlands and 
gorge of the Hudson offer one of the finest pieces of river scenery 
in the world. The great German traveller Baedeker called it 
"finer than the Rhine."5 
A.B., Brown University; .J.D., Columbia University; Member of the Met-: h r k  Bar. 
hleml)er, Legal Advisory Committee to President's Council on Envimnm~ntnl Quality 
(1970-72). 
.See, e.g.. Curnulatii~r Lht of Reportcd Judicial Dccisions Inr~lring the il'otictnol 
fi~~~irotzrncntal Wlicy Act of 1969, 10'2 h l o ~ r r o ~  nt 5-23 (1973). The District uf Columbia 
Circuit reported thirteen NEPA decisions; the Fourth nnd Fifth Circuits ten each; the 
Second, Ninth and Tenth Circuits five each; the First nnd Seventh Circuits fciur each; 
the Third Circuit three; and the Sixth and Eighth Circuits two each. 
' $2 U.S.C. 99 4321-47 (1970). 
a 3% F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 19651, cert. denicd, 384 U.S. 911 (19S6). 
16 U.S.C. 99 791(a)-828(c) (1970). 
:LM F.2d at 613. 
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Having found the Federal Power Commission in violation of 
Congress' mandate, the court ruled that the Scenic Hudson Pres- 
ervation Conference, then an unincorporated association, was an 
"aggrieved party" entitled to defend its special interest. The deci- 
sion presaged the holding in Sierra Club v. Morton8 on the issue 
of standing. 
Citizens Committee v. Volpe7 further evidenced the Circuit's 
adherence to the literal language of the controlling statute, along 
with its liberal view toward the issue of standing in environmen- 
tal suits. Again for a unanimous panel, comprised of Circuit 
Judge Kaufman and District Judge Ryan, the court, with Senior 
Circuit Judge Moore writing the opinion, affirmed the district 
court's order voiding a permit issued to the Army Corps of Engi- 
neers. The permit approved construction of a dike or causeway 
for the then-proposed Hudson River Expressway. The court found 
that Congress alone could approve such construction on a naviga- 
ble river.8 In addition, standing was held to have been established 
under the "aggrieved" person provisions of the Administrative 
Procedure Act.g "The public interest in environmental re- 
s o u r c e ~ , " ~ ~  together with the plaintiffs' demonstrated " 'special 
interest in' the preservation of the natural resources of the Hud- 
son Valley,"" satisfied the elements of standing. 
With the adoption of the NEPA, the Clean Air Act amend- 
ments of 1970,12 and the Federal Water Pollution Control Act 
amendments of 1972,13 Congress vastly expanded the mandates 
for environmental protection. The two cases hereinafter dis- 
cussed involve NEPA in particular; the Clean Air Act and Water 
Quality amendments remain, for the most part, untested.14 
The NEPA decisions were led off by another round of Scenic 
Hudson Preservation Conference v. FPC. lvudge Hays, writing 
for himself and then-Chief Judge Friendly, ruled that the FPC 
had complied with applicable federal law. The court noted that 
405 U.S. 727, 738 n.13 (1972). 
; 425 F.2d 97 (2d Cir. 1970). 
Rivers & Harbors Act of 1899, 33 U.S.C. $ 8  401 et se9. (1970). 
5 U.S.C. 9 702 (1970). 
In 425 F.2d at 105. 
" Id. at 103. 
42 U.S.C. 99 1857 et seq. (1970). 
" 33 U.S.C. $1 115-75 (1970). 
The most famous Clean Air Act case is really one of non-decision. See Fri v. Sierrn 
Clut~, 412 U.S. 541 (1973), based on a decision of the United S t a t e  District Court of the 
District of' Columbia; Sierra Club v. Ruckelshaus, 344 F. Supp. 253 (D.D.C. 1972). 
" 453 F.2d 463 (2d Cir. 1971). cert. denied, 407 U.S. 926 (1972). 
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the "functional elements of the project remain the same"IG and 
reviewed the extent to which the FPC had complied on remand 
with the Federal Power Act. The court held that this review also 
satisfied section 102 of NEPA. In concluding, Judge Hays stated 
that: 
We do not consider that the five years of additional investiga- 
tion which followed our remand were spent in vain. The peti- 
tioners performed a valuable service in that earlier case, and 
later before the Commission. By reason of their efforts the Com- 
mission has reevaluated the entire Cornwall project. The modi- 
fications in the project reflect a heightened awareness of the 
conflict between utilit.arian and aesthetic needs. Whether the 
project as it now stands represents a perfect balance of these 
needs is not for this court to decide. Since the Commission has 
fully performed the duties and responsibilities imp~sed upon it, 
it is our obligation to deny the petitions in all  respect^.'^ 
In dissenting from the majority opinion, Judge Oakes noted that 
the FPC had inadequately evaluated the dangers of t,he project 
to New York City's Catskill Aqueduct and its polluting effect on 
the City's air.18 
The division of the panel in the second Scenic Hudson ruling 
reappeared in Judge Medina's concurring opinion in hfonrse 
County Conservation Council, Inc. v. Volpe.'Wealing with a fed- 
erally funded state highway surrounding the city of Rochester, 
the court held that the Department of Transportation had not 
complied with NEPA and ot.her statutes. The court reversed and 
remanded to the dist.rict court.. Judge Medina wrote: 
I concur, but with some reluctance. I am reluctant because 
I think one unfortunate result of our decision in this case rill 
be a further delay of four or five years that could easily have 
been avoided. And this delay will cause great hardship to the 
people of Rochester who have already waited too long for the 
completion of this Outer Loop around the city. What bothers me 
is that a study of this record makes it fairly certain that after 
all the i's have been dotted and all the t's crossed, the final 
construction will be substantially the same as the one now pro- 
posed and rejected by us. 
On the other hand, I am persuaded that some state and 
- - 
l6 Id. at 465. 
Id. at 481-82. 
I' Id. at 434-85. 
l1 472 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1972). 
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federal highway officials are inclined to look down on conservn- 
tionists and environmentalists as trouble makers. The only way 
to change this attitude is to require full and strict compliance 
with applicable valid statutes and administrative regulations. 
That there has been no such compliance here is clearly estab- 
lished in my brother Anderson's well reasoned and persuasive 
~pinion.~" 
In Hanly v .  Mitchell,2' which preceded Hanly o. 
Kle ind ien~t ,~~  Judge Feinberg, with Judges Waterman and Hays 
rounding out the panel, dealt with the application of NEPA to the 
location of a jail in an urban setting. The court required the 
agency to consider whether the proposed federal action was major 
or minor, and, derivatively, whether or not i t  required review. The 
latter Hanly case, discussed hereinafter, reinforced the stipula- 
tion that the agency conduct a thorough review, even in a prelimi- 
nary decision as to whether a NEPA impact review is needed, The 
consistent posture of the court has been to require close adherence 
to the statute's purposes and language. 
There is an apparent dichotomy in these cases: on the one 
hand, the court has enforced the public policy of environmental 
protection and respected the environmental plaintiffs as private 
attorneys general; on the other hand, the court has rejected fur- 
ther administrative review which would delay rather than deny 
development. This ambivalence also appeared in Greene County 
u. FPC.= In that case, the court, with then-Judge Kaufman writ- 
ing the opinion, invalidated FPC regulations for non-compliance 
with NEPA. The regulations did not provide for an inquiry into 
environmental impact, independent of the applicant's inquiry. 
The court, accordingly, voided an FPC license for a high-voltage 
transmission line, but refused to void two other high voltage lines 
approved on April 10, 1970, without compliance with NEPA. 
Construction of the lines was far advanced and petitioners were 
not timely in raising objections. The court noted that: 
Although we might arrive a t  a different conclusion if there 
were significant potential for subversion of the substantive poli- 
cies expressed in NEPA, . . . the Commission did require 
PASNY [Power Authority of the State of N.Y., applicant] in 
submitting its plans to 'give appropriate consideration to recog- 
Id. at 703. 
460 F.2d 640 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 990 (1972). 
" 471 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1972). cert. denied, 412 U.S. 908 (1973). 
= 465 F.2d 412 (2d Cir. 1972). 
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nized guidelines for protecting the environment' and also con- 
ducted its o m  independent investigation of alternative rout- 
ing~.~' 
In Greene County, the court refused to grant the plaintiffs 
expenses or reasonable attorneys' fees, although it was clear to 
the court 
that a refusal to award petitioners expenses as they are incurred, 
particularly expenses related to production of expert. witnesses, 
may significantly hamper a petitioner's efforts to represent the 
public interest before the Commis~ion.~ 
The court claimed that no statute authorized the fees and de- 
clined to award costs and fees under the court's equity powers. 
The issue of costs and attorneys' fees have progressed dong 
the same line as the issue of ~tanding.~"environmental plaintiffs 
are to defend the public interest. effectively, they mill require 
more than liberal standing doctrines. The court in Greene County 
did not reject the equity award; rather i t  did "not find compelling 
need for i t  a t  this point . . . ."= The Second Circuit" pp~siti~n 
on this issue thus remains uncharted. 
The pattern emerging from t,hese rulings shows cautious reli- 
ance on the governing statute and a grateful recognition of the 
conservationists' public dedication in bringing governmental 
bodies to task for ignoring environmental laws, tempered (1) by 
a preference for t.he completion of beneficial developments, such 
as electrical energy or needed roadways and (2) by holding conser- 
vationists at arm's length, perhaps, for fear of stirring them to 
excessive action. The latter fear is groundless, in light of the 
relatively few environmental cases both nat.ionally and in the 
Second Circuit.= 
The court in Hun@ v. Kleindiensta grappled with the necess- 
=' Id. at $25 (citations omitted). 
Id. at $26. 
For recent developments permitting attornep.' fees in envimnmcntal mrs, sce 
1iol)inson. ('r~urt Alcnrded Counsel Fees in EnrironmentaI Litigation, I & 11. 169 N.Y.L.J. 
Nos. 16 6: 39 at 1. col. 1 (1973); Robinson. Enrimnmental Litigutian: Trcnd F a ~ ~ r s  
Alrnrdirlg ('c~unsel Fees, 170 N.Y.L.J. No. $9 at 1, col. 1 (1973). 
" 455 F:2d at $27. 
As indicated by the statistics in note 1 supra, envimnrnentalists have not Rosdcd 
the rr>iirts with litigation. Their cases, like those in the civil rights field, have bccn 
rarefi~lly chosen and professionally prosecuted. In all but n hnndful of cnviranmental 
suits. the plaintitFs have prevailed. Bemuse environmental cases tauch upon vastly ditFcr- 
ent topics. courts of general jurisdiction nre most appropriate for the rcvie:.~ of cnviran- 
inental administrative decisions. 
471 F2d 823 (2d Cir. 1972). ct-rt. denied. 412 U.S. 908 (19731. 
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ity of an environmental impact evaluation under NEPA in the 
gray area between "major" projects which require review and 
"minor" projects which do not. Again, the Second Circuit experi- 
enced difficulty in compromising between environmental protec- 
tion and development, as pointed out by Judge Mansfield's ma- 
jority opinion and Judge Friendly's dissent. 
In Port of New York Authority v. United  state^,^" the court 
declined to require a NEPA evaluation for proposed tariffs li- 
censed to the Perm Control by the Interstate Commerce Commis- 
sion. The court found i t  impossible to entertain "the careful bal- 
ancing analysis mandated by NEPA,"" in that  the inevitable 
choice between development and environmental protection was 
not presented to them. Rather, the issue was the environmental 
effect of a tariff change for freight barge lighterage service in New 
York Harbor. 
The court declined to weigh environmental impact a t  the 
early stage of tariff approval; instead, it  required the complainant 
to raise these issues directly before the ICC, noting that  
[olne might argue that a simple solution to the problem caused 
by the constraint of time is to require the Commission to pre- 
serve the status quo pending the preparation of an environmen- 
tal impact statement. In the instant case this would mean stay- 
ing Penn Central's proposed tariffs. But such a solution is too 
simple. It overlooks the fact that preserving the status quo can 
be as determental to the environment as permitting changes in 
the status quo. Just as cities can argue that increases in tariffs 
cause the diversion of traffic to trucks, thereby increasing air 
pollution, so railroads can argue that losses incurred on one line 
must be made up on another either in the form of increased 
tariffs or decreased quality of service, which in turn discourage 
the use of this other line, thereby diverting traffic to trucks (or, 
in the case of passenger lines, to automobiles), which diversion 
in turn causes an increase in air pollution." 
Port of New York Authority, therefore, can be read to require 
a thorough evaluation of environmental impact by the adminis- 
trative agency. Court review was not undertaken on the theory 
that  i t  was premature, just as  eleventh-hour reviews were dis- 
missed as  tardy in Greene County. Such judicial reasoning is not 
compatible with Hanly, which required that  the agency itself 
" 451 F.2d 783 (2d Cir. 1971). 
Id. at 790. 
== Id. 
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decide whether NEPA review was warranted. 
More recently, in United States v. American Csanamid 
Co.," Chief Judge Kaufman succinctly restated what may be 
considered the Circuit's straight.fonvard attitude toward imple- 
menting the congressional mandate for environmental protection. 
The ruling upheld a district. court. finding that the defendant had 
violated the Refuse Act of 1899. Judge Kaufman, writing for s 
panel comprised of Circuit Judge Smith and District Judge 
Bryan, stated: 
The interpretation which appellant urges upon this Court 
is precisely the type of "cramped" reading that the Supreme 
Court has cautioned against. . . . Semantic gymnastics must 
not be allowed to undermine a Congressional purpose to pre- 
serve the purity of our watenvays. Conservation of our once 
formidable natural resources is a matter of profound national 
concern. Congress has acted to accommodate the diverse, often 
conflicting, needs of our highly industrialized society through 
legislation, such as the Refuse Act. of 1899. Moreover, in arriving 
at our conclusion we are not. unmindful of Learned HanCs elo- 
quent guide to statutory construction, that we must "remember 
that statutes always have some purpose or object to accomplish, 
whose sympathetic and imaginative discovery is the surest 
guide to their meaning."g' 
At present, it remains uncertain whether the Second Circuit 
requires strict adherence to NEPA, as Hanly and the dissent sf 
Judge Oakes in Scenic Hudson might indicate; or tvhether the 
court has read into the environmental laws certain exemptions, 
as illustrated in Judge Hays' second Scenic Hudson ruling, Judge 
Moore's decision in Port of Neur York Authority, or Judge Med- 
ina7s concurring opinion in Monroe County. Certainly, it is not 
the court's role to make normative decisions in favor of either 
rivers or roads, power lines or mountains. No means exist to sim- 
plify the process of weighing competing public policies. 
It is apparent from Judge Anderson's decision in hfonroe 
County that environmental protection is a consideration which 
must be addressed prior to the approval of any new development. 
"Congress has mandated that all federal lens shall be interpreted 
in accordance with t.he policies set forth in NEPA."= NEPA cer- 
a 480 F.2d 1132 (2d Cir. 1973). 
a' Id. at 1135 (citations omitted). 
" 472 F.2d at 700. "In other words, a rand must not take parkland, u n l ~ s  a prudent 
person, concerned with the quality of the humon environment, i s  mnvinced that there &, 
no way to avoid doing so." Id. 
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tainly does not discourage environmental impact review; yet the 
tendency to find exemptions persists where projects are near com- 
pletion or the agency deems its act not a "major federal action." 
The Second Circuit, which confronted the issue of whether a jail 
was "major," has not decided whether a nuclear research reactor 
is 
How the Second Circuit will resolve its ambivalence toward 
environmental cases is unclear. Chief Judge Kaufman's ruling in 
American Cyanamid offers the most attractive lead, a t  once com- 
patible with the Hanly rulings and the dissents of Judges 
Friendly and Oakes. Requirements of environmental protection 
are too far advanced, both legally and scientifically, to excuse 
inadequate administrative compliance with NEPA, the Refuse 
Act, the Clean Air Act, or other laws. Since most agencies, as 
their primary task, regulate economic development, the bias in 
favor of that priority often supplants the new interest in environ- 
mental protection. NEPA was intended to eliminate that bias, 
and unless the courts rule as the Second Circuit did in Hanly and 
Monroe County, that intent will not be served. 
See the ruling in Morningside Renewal Council v. AEC, 482 F.2d 234 (2d Cir. 19731, 
in which Judge Hays, writing for himself and Judge Mulligan, refused to reverse an AEC 
decision that the license for operation of Columbia University's TRIGA MARK 11 nuclear 
research reactor was not a major federal action, citing the Hanly jail cases as  support 
t herefir. Judge Oakes wrote an exhaustive dissent, also relying on the Hanly cnss .  Judgo 
Oakes observed that "by upholding the AEC's determination that  there would not bo any 
such significant potential effect here [requiring NEPA review], the majority apparently 
adopted the "rational basis" standard of review rejected by the Hanly court. 471 F.2d a t  
829. The effect of the majority's decision is to provide the agencies with a loopholo by 
which to render NEPA meaningless. 
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